The Administrative Costs of Local Government Property-Based User Charges and Their Regressivity by Blažić, Helena et al.
 Blažić, H., Stašić, S. & Drezgić, S. (2011). The Administrative Costs of Local Government 
Property-Based User Charges and Their Regressivity. Uprava IX(4), 7–25.  7 
1.01 Original scientific article 
The Administrative Costs of Local 
Government Property-Based User 
Charges and Their Regressivity* 
UDK: 332.2:352(497.5) 
Helena Blažić 
University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, Croatia 
helena@efri.hr 
Sandra Stašić 
City of Rijeka 
sandra.stasic@rijeka.hr 
Saša Drezgić 
University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, Croatia 
sdrezgic@efri.hr 
ABSTRACT 
The paper measures the administrative costs (assessment and collection 
costs) of immovable property user charges in local governments in Croatia. This 
study represents a small scale survey comprising mostly small local governments. 
First, we establish their costs structure and then we compare the cost-revenue 
ratio with their size. As expected, the administrative costs of the analyzed user 
charges turned out to be regressive in regards to the size of local governments. 
The results imply that substitution of those different charges would be 
beneficial for local government budgets. In order to mitigate the problem we 
propose several alternatives: one general tax/charge; amalgamation of the 
smallest local governments or referring to assessment and collection of user 
charges in small local governments to the larger/mutual unit. 
                                              
*  The presented results are part of the scientific project Strategy of Socioeconomic 
Relations of the Croatian Society, No. 081-0000000-1264 supported by the Ministry of 
Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia. 
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1 Introduction 
The research on operative costs of taxation (administrative and 
compliance costs of taxation) relates to the third element of tax burden – 
the so called "hidden" costs of the tax system. These costs accrue to the 
"visible" taxes actually paid and "excess burden" of taxation (deadweight 
welfare loss). 
Administrative and compliance costs in particular, in the last fourty 
years, have been the subject of growing interest in developed countries1. 
The same trend is now present in transitional countries2 as well as in Far 
East3 and India (Das-Gupta, 2006).4 
As it has already been addressed, more attention was devoted to 
compliance than administrative costs, probably due to the rising tax 
complexity and resulting burden for the private sector (however, the rising 
interest of public sector efficiency in recent times is one of the reasons why 
these costs should also be further investigated). One of the most striking 
conclusions to be drawn from tax compliance literature, which became 
the mutual result for most of those surveys, was the one about the 
                                              
1 For instance Sandford, Godwin, Hardwick & Butterworth, 1981; Sandford, Godwin & 
Hardwick, 1989; Bannock & Albach, 1987 (acccording to Bannock, 2001); Sandford & 
Hasseldine, 1992 (acc. to Hasseldine, 1995); Allers, 1994; Pope, Fayle & Chen, 1994; 
Pope, 1995; Evans, Ritchie, Tran-Nam & Walpole, 1997; Collard & Godwin, 1999; 
Hudson & Godwin, 2000; Tran-Nam, Evans, Ritchie & Walpole, 2000; Gurd & Turner, 
2001; OECD, 2001; Ritchie, 2001; Slemrod & Venkatesh, 2002; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004; Vaillancourt and Clemens, 2008;… This list focuses on 
business units research (instead of that focused on individuals), since the regressive effect 
of compliance costs analysis in this research will also be applied to local governments. 
However, similar regressive effect (depending on the income level) is presented in 
numerous compliance costs researches covering individuals and their personal income 
taxes well. Furthermore, the same effect is presented concerning negative taxes also – 
grants submission and reporting process (McGregor-Lowndes & Ryan, 2009). 
2 For instance Klun, 2002 and 2004; Blažić, 2004 and 2004a; Bratić & Pitarević, 2004; 
Vitek, Pavel & Pubal, 2003; Klun & Blažić, 2005. 
3 The synthesis of such studies is given in Ariff, 2001. Some small scale studies are covered 
in Bannock, 2001. 
4 There are also some studies from the rest of the world. For one of the most exhaustive list 
of the studies see Evans, 2003. 
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regressivity of those costs that disproportionally burden small business 
units. Furthermore, even small business tax compliance costs are found to 
be regressive. The same pattern of regressivity that was internationally 
proven to be true for the entire range of businesses holds for the subgroup 
of the small business units as well. This is in accordance with the literature 
that shows that the regressive effect of compliance costs is especially 
emphasized at the lower end of the size scale5. 
A smaller number of administrative cost surveys have not addressed 
this question specifically. Furthermore, those studies deal mostly with tax 
administration and the central government. The researches mostly 
encompassed taxes (the social security contributions were usually also 
included, which are regarded as taxes in the broader sense). 
Our research deals with certain aspects of administrative costs that 
were either not covered before or covered just very lightly: local 
governments and their administration (instead of tax administration in 
general which was mostly covered); user charges (instead of taxes); and 
finally, the regressivity of administrative costs (instead of the compliance 
ones), causing a significantly higher burden on small local governments. 
The user charges in the research are those related to immovable property. 
Their conceptual element, which allows regarding them as taxes (instead 
of charges) or proposing their substitution with taxes are taken into 
consideration as well. 
The aim of the paper is to measure the administrative costs of 
presented user charges in relative terms (using classical cost/revenue 
ratio) and to determine the relationship between this ratio and the size of 
local governments. It is presumably believed that such costs are regressive 
in the same manner as the compliance costs of companies of different 
size. 
The methodology described above is applied to the data gathered by 
an e-mail survey. It is a small scale survey6 and since it encompasses 
smaller local governments, the only big city has been removed from the 
sample prior to the analysis as an outlier. 
                                              
5 See previous footnotes and especially OECD 2001. 
6 The results of small scale tax compliance costs surveys, which followed the large-scale 
ones yielded similar results (for instance Bannock, 2001). That is why small scale surveys 
could be relevant for this type of research and it is reasonable to assume that the same 
holds for the administrative costs of taxation (and user charges) also. 
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The paper is outlined as follows. After the introduction, we briefly 
describe the user charges related to immovable property in Croatia, within 
which administrative costs were measured. The third part of the paper 
explains methodological issues and the fourth one deals with the results 
(administrative costs structure, their cost-revenue ratio, the relationship 
between cost-revenue ratio and size, revenue policy proposals for local 
governments). As usual, concluding remarks are at the end of the paper. 
2 Local government user charges related to 
immovable property in Croatia 
Local government user charges that are related to immovable 
property and collected by the local governments (cities and municipalities) 
in Croatia are as follows: communal charge, 7 communal contribution, 
historical monuments rent and water regulation charge. The first two 
charges are of the biggest fiscal importance and comprise about 
17% of all the local government revenues in Croatia 
(http://www.mfin.hr/hr/lokalni-proracun-2002). The last one is just 
collected by the local government on behalf of the public enterprise 
"Croatian waters" that belongs to the central government in the broader 
sense. 
2.1 Communal charge 
Formally, the Croatian tax system does not include a general 
recurrent tax on immovable property (property tax), which is common to 
most other countries8. However, the communal charge could be regarded 
rather as some sort of simple property tax than user charge, based on its 
real characteristics and taxes / user charges definitions. After presenting its 
legal characteristics, the reasons for considering it some sort of "tax" will 
be elaborated briefly. 
The communal charge is paid by the owners or users of residential 
and business buildings (including garages), developed land used for 
business purposes and undeveloped land for building purposes. The 
amount paid per m2 is decided by local governments in question without 
                                              
7  "Communal (charge)" could be translated as "public utilities charge" or "municipal 
(economy) charge". The same refers to "communal contribution". Here the exact wording 
"communal" will be maintained. 
8 However, Croatian tax system includes tax on holiday houses and tax on the use of 
public land as some partial forms of immovable property taxation. 
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any special limits imposed by the central government (unlike the local 
taxes). The amount of this charge depends on the above stated purposes 
of real estate use and its location characteristics. 
The revenues are strictly earmarked for the purposes of the drainage 
of storm water, cleaning and maintenance of public areas, maintenance 
of cemeteries and the maintenance of local roads and public lighting. 
However, due to the greater autonomy in determining the burden of those 
charges and their amount (unlike those of the tax ones) they are often 
misused for other purposes in the scope of local government 
responsibilities. The fact that its revenues are often (mis)used to finance 
other local government expenditures (above stated earmarked ones) 
already implies the need for modification of such revenues and the 
development of immovable property (real estate) tax. 
As it is well known, taxes are compulsory unrequited payments to 
general government (for instance OECD, 2011, p. 302). They are 
"unrequited" in the sense that benefits provided by government to 
taxpayers are not normally in proportion to their payments. The fact that 
they are "unrequited payments" precisely represents their basic (of course, 
not the only one) difference in comparison with user charges. 
Although seemingly straightforward, the term "user charges" has no 
set meaning9 (Richardson, 2005, p. 456–457) and it could be defined 
broadly as prices that the government charges on identifiable individuals 
or entities for a service or goods that it controls. More narrowly, they can 
be defined as prices that government charges to recover its costs of 
providing special benefits to an identifiable recipient beyond those that 
accrue to the general public. This narrower definition rests on a distinction 
between special benefits to individuals and businesses and general 
benefits to the public. 
This distinction is, of course, clearer in theory than in practice, but 
exactly in the case of Croatian communal charge it is obvious. 
Furthermore, the users are not charged according to the benefits they get 
from the financed public utilities described above and it is not possible to 
exclude any non-payer from those public utilities. Therefore, these 
payments seem to be "unrequited". However, there is another benefit here 
                                              
9  User charges are commonly accepted term, although there is no formal definition 
existing compared to those of taxes. The definition used here is taken from the Taxation 
and Tax Policy Encyclopedia, based on the US federal agencies. 
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– the one related to the higher value of local real estate due to the higher 
level of services / public utilities listed above (as well as other local 
services). It is well known that this is the inherent characteristic of classical 
local real estate (immovable property) taxes, making them closer to the 
property related user charges again. 
In general, it is not easy to distinguish between those user charges 
which have features of taxes and those which do not. While a charge is 
levied in connection with a specific service or activity, the strength of the 
link between the charge and the service provided may vary considerably. 
The same refers to the relation between the amount of the fee and the 
costs of providing the service. Where the recipient of a service pays a fee 
clearly related to the cost of providing the service, the levy may be 
regarded as requited (non-tax). The levy could be considered as 
"unrequited" especially in the cases (OECD, 2011, p. 303) where the 
charge greatly exceeds the costs of providing the service, where a payer is 
not the receiver of the benefit, where government does not provide a 
specific service in return for the levy or where benefits received are not in 
proportion with the payments. 
It could be concluded that Croatian communal charge is some sort of 
simple property tax, which is not based on its value, but size, purpose/sort 
and location, depending on the municipality in question. Although it is 
usual for immovable property taxes to be based on the property value, 
according to the OECD (OECD, 2011, p. 311) property taxes could be 
levied in terms of other characteristics of real property (for example size or 
location), from which a presumed rent or capital value can be derived. 
Therefore, this charge could be regarded as tax. 
Recently, there have been many advocators for the introduction of a 
classical (value based) property tax in Croatia. It is often neglected that 
such a tax, if introduced, should not be added, but substituted for the 
communal charge (and potentially some other charges in question). 
2.2 Communal contribution 
The same local public ("communal") infrastructure listed above is 
financed by the earmarked revenues from communal contribution 
charges. However, communal contribution charges finance the 
construction of that "communal" infrastructure. In addition, the revenues 
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based on communal contribution charges cover the costs related to the 
land where such infrastructure is situated as well as its relocation. 
The contribution is paid by the owner of the land upon which the new 
building is built (or by the investor), who, in this way, directly participates 
in the building costs of such communal infrastructure. 
The amount paid is decided by the local government and is based on 
similar elements as in the case of communal charge. The zone coefficients 
here reflect the level of development of relevant local infrastructure. 
However, the funds are strictly earmarked and even refundable to the 
payer if the local infrastructure is not built/developed completely 
according to the planned programme (in the proportion that local 
infrastructure reflects the building programme goals). So, this contribution 
really represents the user charge. 
2.3 Historical monuments rent 
Unlike the former user charges, the revenue from this charge is 
divided between the relevant local government (60%) and the central 
government (40%). 
This charge is based on the assumption that historical monuments 
could increase the profit of business entities. It is paid by 
corporate/personal income taxpayers that use the historical monument to 
increase their revenue. This relates to cases when businesses are situated 
inside or in the area of the cultural-historical unit. This "rent" is again paid 
per m2 where the amount per m2 is decided by the local government, but 
inside the limits set by the central government. Such rent is denoted as 
"direct" and it is related to the user charge concept. Its revenues are, of 
course, earmarked. 
Another form of user charges is the "indirect" historical monument rent 
that is paid again by corporate/personal income taxpayers, but only for 
specific activities (trade, hotels, traffic, banks and financial institutions, 
betting and gambling, services) regardless of their location. It is paid on 
their turnover (amount of revenues) charged by the rate of 0,05%. The 
revenues are again divided between the local government (56%) and the 
central government (44%). It is obvious that the concept of this rent is 
more closely related to the (of course earmarked) tax rather than the user 
charge. 
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2.4 Water regulation charge 
There are as many as eight water charges in Croatia and revenues 
from them belong to the public enterprise/corporation "Croatian waters". 
This water charge is collected by local governments along with the 
communal charge and paid per m2. 
The amounts paid per m2 are set by the central government and differ 
according to the real estate purpose. The revenues are, of course, 
earmarked10 and used at the territory where they are collected. 
Local governments receive a fee on the level of 5% of revenues 
collected for this collection service on behalf of Croatian waters. The main 
idea was to save the administrative costs by collecting both charges 
together and reimbursing local governments for such service. However, 
the stated 5% rate of the fee turned out to be insufficient for covering the 
assessment and collection costs for smaller local governments. This is the 
reason why the territorial Croatian waters affiliates that posses the real 
estate evidence do the water regulation charge assessment and collection 
process on their own. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 The survey 
The survey encompassed the costs of assessing the amount of 
immovable property user fees due as well as all costs related to the 
collection of user fees, which altogether could be regarded as the 
administrative costs of user fees. The fees/charges covered were: 
communal charge, communal contribution, historical monuments rent 
and water regulation charge. 
The survey questionnaire was sent by e-mail to all local governments 
(cities and municipalities) for which an e-mail address was available 
(around 97% of all units)11. The e-mail address availability was chosen 
because it is the easiest and cheapest way to gather data and because it 
enabled coverage of almost all local governments (due to the stated high 
percentage). However, the remaining 3% of local governments 
                                              
10 Flood protection, melioration, land acquisition… 
11 At the time of the research there were 556 local governments (cities and munipalities 
altogether) (Republic of Croatia, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009, p.59). 
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(municipalities mostly) were expected to be less developed, which could 
lead to higher administrative costs also. They were also expected to be 
among non-respondents. 
The questionnaire contained two groups of questions. The first group 
of questions contained general questions about the size of the local 
government unit, the number of employees and departments, average 
wage and budget size. The second group of questions contained detailed 
questions about organizational elements, indebtedness and user charges 
collection as well as administrative costs specified by sort12. 
Out of 536 survey questionnaires sent by e-mail only 35 were 
returned, resulting in a response rate of only 6,5%. That definitely 
classifies the survey as being the "small scale". Although most earlier 
surveys of similar costs (tax compliance costs of business unites) were 
predominantly large-scale ones (see footnote 1), the results of small scale 
tax compliance costs surveys, which followed the large-scale ones yielded 
similar results (Bannock, 2001). However, a very low response rate raises 
questions about the reliability of the findings. They are relevant under 
condition that relatively small number of respondents reflects (at least in 
general) the population (local government units: cities and municipalities). 
In general, we argue that this is true concerning the teritorial scope as well 
as different organizational forms of property based user charges 
collection, and even concerning the units’s size (explained more briefly at 
the end of this chapter). No additional research (in the form of short 
survey with only one or a couple of questions) was performed later in 
order to find out whether the non-respondents tend to have higher costs 
or different cost structure. However, it is reasonable to expect that the 
respondents were a little bit better organized and to expect that their costs 
were lower (and even revenues higher) in comparison with the non-
respondents. In addition, the non-responents could mildly influence not 
only average costs and other cost structure data (Figure 1), but also their 
cost-revenue ratios (Figure 1 and 2). Still, it is reasonably to believe that 
the same regressive pattern would be present if the non-respondents were 
included, perhaps with the generally mildly lower "efficiency" data. 
Unfortunately, eight of the questionnaires returned were filled out 
inappropriately or contained wrong/missing data, and therefore, had to 
                                              
12 The value of time spent was calculated according to the gross wage and number of 
working hours. 
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be excluded as well. The data for one (big) city was added using the 
original data and face to face interviews.13 
It is interesting to point out that mostly smaller local governments 
returned the questionnaire. Looking at the number of employees around 
30% of them have up to 5 employees and around 60% from 6–50. 
Concerning their population, even 70% of them have less then 5.000 
inhabitants and almost 80% have less than 10.000 inhabitants (the rest 
up to 50.000). But it is interesting that this structure reflects the population 
in question pretty accurately, so that the small local units are not 
overrepresented in the sample. On the contrary, even around 85% of 
local units (cities and municipalities) have less than 10.000 inhabitants. 
However, the absolute number of the bigger (10.000–50.000) local units 
was too low for the sample to be representative for the entire population 
and this was especially true for the only one big town (more than 100.000 
inhabitants), which was later excluded from the sample (Figure 3). Thus, 
the average structural data in absolute numbers (Figure 1) should be 
taken with great reserve. For that reason we point out the average 
structural data in percentage terms. They are even more reliable, because 
it is also established that the percentages do not differ greatly with the 
change in local units’ size. 
3.2 Cost – revenue ratio and size 
The efficiency of real estate user charges from the local 
administration’s point of view engaged in their assessment and collection 
was measured by the ratio of total administrative costs of those local 
governments and total revenues collected (administrative costs as 
percentage of revenues collected). 
Usually, similar analyses – those concerning administrative costs of 
taxation (costs of tax administration or similar additional units such as 
customs administration etc.) were done at the level of aggregate tax 
administration, since it is very hard to attribute those costs to the lower 
organizational units (departments or territorial units of tax administration). 
In those researches the disaggregation was not necessary, since the 
studies were dealt by the general government level only. 
                                              
13 One of the authors is employed in the stated big city administration, so its official data 
as well as face to face interviews were used to add this unit into the the survey data. 
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Here we have a different case, since we compare different local 
governments. Such approach implies an interesting relationship between 
their cost-revenue ratio and size. 
Since the revenues collected and used as an element of classical cost-
revenue ratio also signify the size of the local governments14 (representing 
some sort of their "turnover" in comparison to the compliance costs of 
taxation of business units), that data could also be used for determining 
the relationship between them. 
However, some elements of the standard criticism for "costs as a 
percentage of revenue" as an efficiency indicator should be taken into 
account (Sandford, Godwin & Hardwick, 1989, p. 19–21), which, in this 
study, particularly refers to revenue as a size indicator as well. In regards 
to that, there are two problems. First, the ratio is dependent on the 
tax/charge rate, which is set by the local governments for the first two of 
the listed four revenues, which form the bulk of the immovable property 
charges revenues. However, although the zone coefficients for the most 
important revenue – communal charge differ significantly (the range of the 
charges can be fivefold, comparing the most attractive zones of some 
cities), this element should not be observed in isolation, without taking 
into consideration zone areas, as well as their number and dispersion15. 
Looking at the differences in rates altogether coupled with the numerous 
differences in other elements of charges, the entire differences in burden 
are not as striking as they appear at first sight. 
The second problem relates to the proportion of revenues collected 
from potential revenues. The differences between small local governments 
are not that large; however, the percentage is significantly higher for the 
big city in the sample, making it even "bigger" and "more efficient" than 
the rest of the units. Nevertheless, this and the above stated reason(s) 
present the additional element in favour of excluding it from the sample 
analysis, as described in the next chapter. 
                                              
14  The amount of those revenues is positively correlated with the size of the local 
governments as well as the number of employees. They are not the funcion of value (as 
"proper"" real estate taxes), which should imply higher revenues for the real estates in the 
coastal area for instance. However, they are disproportionally higher for big towns, which 
will be addressed later. 
15 For instance, the highest coefficient of communal charge for the first zone in the big city 
in our sample is even 2,4% higher than the average one, but it is limited to a very narrow 
area only. The coefficients in other zones are at the level of the Croatian average. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Administrative costs structure
Figure 1 presents the average structure of measured administrative 
costs. It is interesting to point out that unit size does not significantly affect 
the cost structure. 
Figure 1: The structure of administrative costs (in Croatian kunas and in percent)
Source: Survey data 
Employee expenses participate with the largest share in total costs 
(almost half of them), which is completely expected, since their services 
comprise the major part of such costs. Outsourced services comprise the 
second largest share in total costs and participate with one quarter, 
followed by the cost of capital assets and equipment maintainance as well 
as operating expenses. 
As it has already been pointed out, the 
relation to size does not change in time.
4.2 Regressive effect of administrative costs
The relationship between the administrative costs of immovable 
property user charges as the percentage of their revenue collected and the 
local government size (measured as those revenue collected) is based on 
the assumption that the rise in size (revenue) decreases the percentage of 
administrative costs in those revenues. The influence of the amount
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of revenue on the stated percentage is explained by the double logarithm 
regression model Y = α * X b. That model directly determines the elasticity 
of the dependent variable (administrative costs as a percentage of 
revenues) in relation to the independent one (user charges revenues in 
000 of Croatian Kunas). The stated relationship is presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The relationship between the administrative costs of user charges and 
their revenue 
 
Source: Survey data 
Model equation: Y = 3,9161 X –0,45 
The figure is constructed by using the logarithm values of data from 
the survey. It is obvious that the rise in revenues results in the sharp 
decline of the cost percentage (R = 0,9213; R2 = 0,8488; p < 0.01). 
Even a 84,88% variation in the cost size could be explained by the 
amount of revenues. 
That implies the regressive nature of those costs in relation to size 
(similar as with the compliance costs of taxation). This is due to the fixed 
element of those costs regardless of their size and implies the competitive 
disadvantage of smaller governments, which is especially strong at the 
beginning as can be seen from the line slope (the relationship between 
variables is exponential). 
The results also show that it is meaningless to calculate the "average 
efficiency" (the percentage of costs in revenues) since the range of data is 
very broad and takes values from 5% to 50%. 
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However, one local government – of course the only real big city in 
the sample, has enormously high revenues not only in comparison to the 
average revenue but also in comparison with the second largest local 
government (even seven times higher)16. We follow the usual econometric 
procedure of removal of outliers. That is why this city is not included in 
further analysis and that results in the following regression (Figure 3). In 
such way we restrict our analysis to small local governments. This finding 
clearly shows that larger cities have to be analysed under separate 
quantitative analysis. This can be explained by substantial fiscal disparities 
between larger and smaller local governments in Croatia. Therefore, 
mixing local governments of different size might give us misleading 
findings on the issue of administrative costs. 
Figure 3: The relationship between the administrative costs of user charges and 
their revenue for small local governments 
 
Source: Survey data 
Model equation: Y = 5,1561 X –0,5019 
It is obvious that the exemption of the big town results in a rising 
slope within the equation17. This can be explained by the fixed elements of 
costs and the resulting economy of scales. Even a minor rise in goodness 
                                              
16 Its inclusion makes the curve falling sharply at the beginning and beeing more skewed 
at its end. 
17 Again, p < 0,01. 
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of fit (R2) indicates a very high level of adjustments to the calculated values 
with the real data. 
The results indicate the regressive effect of administrative costs of 
immovable property user charges. Costs are clearly regressive with small 
local governments bearing a significantly higher burden, especially the 
smallest ones. Namely, as it is well known from the literature, the 
regressive effect of compliance costs is particularly emphasized at the 
lower end of the size scale (it is slightly milder at the upper end of the 
scale). This is proven here as well. 
The possible solutions for those results (presented in the concluding 
remarks) are in line with the theoretical models pointing out that »the 
larger the public sector, and thus the tax revenue, the more taxes there 
should be« (Yitzhak, 1979, p. 475). It could be easily concluded that in 
the case of small (local) public sector units the vice versa is relevant and 
that, of course, the same conclusion applied to taxes could also be 
relevant for user charges. So, the possible solution(s) could be based 
either on "less" taxes/user charges or "larger" public sector units, as 
presented below. 
5 Conclusion 
It is widely known that the compliance costs of taxation are regressive 
in relation to the size of business taxpayers. 
The same is true in the case of user charges (instead of taxes), their 
administrative costs (instead of compliance ones) and different local 
governments (instead of business units). Although our research is focused 
on user charges related to immovable property only (with their 
administrative costs being completely borne by the local governments), it 
is obvious that its results could be broadened. 
The results of the research suggest two possible reform alternatives. 
The first one is the substitution of all those charges with one single charge 
or local property tax, which would be expected to reduce the 
administrative costs for the local governments. However, the assessment 
based on the value of property could raise additional administrative costs 
(the initial ones in particular). That requires comparative analysis of such 
savings and the new costs that might result. 
Helena Blažić, Sandra Stašić, Saša Drezgić 
The Administrative Costs of Local Government 
Property-Based User Charges and Their Regressivity 
22 Uprava, letnik IX, 4/2011 
The second one relates to the integration of small local governments 
in general, or only concerning their charges/taxes assessment and 
collection units in order to avoid/mitigate the negative regressive effects of 
administrative costs for those smallest units. The need for such reforms is 
not only addressed by the limited analysis in this research but also by the 
regressive effect of other types of costs that burden the smallest local 
governments. 
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POVZETEK 
UPRAVNI STROŠKI LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAV S 
TAKSAMI ZA UPORABNIKE NEPREMIČNIN IN 
NJIHOVA DEGRESIVNOST* 
Ključne besede: administrativni stroški, takse za uporabnike, lokalna 
samouprava, nepremičnine 
Za stroške upravljanja in predvsem skladnosti je v zadnjih 40 letih vse 
več zanimanja. Več pozornosti se namenja stroškom skladnosti kot 
upravnim stroškom, verjetno zaradi vedno večje kompleksnosti davkov in 
posledične obremenjenosti zasebnega sektorja (hkrati pa je v zadnjem 
času povečano zanimanje za učinkovitost javnega sektorja razlog, zakaj bi 
bilo treba tudi te stroške bolj podrobno preučiti). Eden od bolj izstopajočih 
zaključkov na osnovi literature o davčni skladnosti, ki je nastala kot 
skupen rezultat večine takšnih raziskav, je ugotovitev o degresivnosti tistih 
stroškov, ki nesorazmerno bremenijo majhne poslovne enote. Poleg tega 
so se za degresivne izkazali celo stroški skladnosti za majhna podjetja. 
Enak vzorec degresivnosti, za katerega je na mednarodni ravni dokazano, 
da velja za celoten podjetniški spekter, prav tako velja za podskupino 
majhnih poslovnih enot. To je skladno z literaturo, ki kaže, da je 
degresivni učinek stroškov skladnosti posebno izrazit na nižjem območju 
velikostne lestvice. 
Manjše število raziskav o upravnih stroških se ni podrobno ukvarjalo s 
tem vprašanjem. Poleg tega te študije večinoma obravnavajo davčno 
upravo in centralno upravo. Zajemajo predvsem davke (raziskave so 
običajno vključevale tudi prispevke za socialno varnost, ki se obravnavajo 
kot davki v širšem smislu). 
Pričujoča raziskava se ukvarja z določenimi vidiki upravnih stroškov, 
ki do zdaj še niso bili raziskani ali pa le površno: lokalne samoupravne 
enote in njihova uprava (namesto davčne uprave na splošno, ki je bila 
večinoma predmet proučevanja); takse za uporabnike (namesto davkov); 
in končno, degresivnost upravnih stroškov (namesto stroškov skladnosti), 
                                              
*  Predstavljeni rezultati so del znanstvenega projekta Strategija družbenoekonomskih 
odnosov hrvaške družbe, št. 081-0000000-1264, ki jo je podprlo Ministrstvo za znanost, 
izobraževanje in šport Republike Hrvaške. 
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ki majhnim lokalnim samoupravnim enotam nalaga bistveno večje breme. 
Ta raziskava obravnava takse za uporabnike, ki so povezane z 
nepremičninami. 
Raziskava manjšega obsega (e-vprašalnik) je zajemala stroške 
obračunavanja zneska plačljivih taks za uporabnike nepremičnin, pa tudi 
vse stroške v zvezi z njihovim pobiranjem, ki jih lahko skupaj 
obravnavamo kot upravne stroške s taksami za uporabnike. Zajete takse 
so: komunalne takse (taksa za javne službe, taksa za mestno 
gospodarstvo), komunalni prispevek (prispevek za javne službe), stanarina 
za zgodovinske spomenike in taksa za urejanje voda. Vprašalnik so 
večinoma vrnile manjše enote lokalne samouprave. 
Učinkovitost taks za uporabnike nepremičnin s stališča lokalne 
samouprave, ki se ukvarja z njihovim obračunavanjem in pobiranjem, je 
bila merjena na osnovi razmerja med skupnimi upravnimi stroški teh 
lokalnih samoupravnih enot in skupnimi prejetimi prihodki (upravni stroški 
kot odstotek prejetih prihodkov). 
Podobne analize, ki zadevajo upravne stroške obdavčevanja (stroški 
davčne uprave ali podobnih dodatnih enot, kot je carinska uprava), se 
ponavadi izvajajo na ravni skupne davčne uprave, saj je te stroške zelo 
težko razvrstiti po nižjih organizacijskih enotah (oddelkih ali ozemeljskih 
enotah davčne uprave). V teh raziskavah razčlenjevanje ni bilo potrebno, 
ker so študije tematiko obravnavale samo na ravni splošne uprave. 
Naš primer je drugačen, saj primerjamo različne enote lokalne 
samouprave. Takšen pristop kaže na zanimivo zvezo med razmerjem 
stroškov in prihodkov ter velikostjo teh enot. 
Ker prejeti prihodki, ki smo jih uporabili kot element klasičnega 
razmerja med stroški in prihodki, označujejo tudi velikost posameznih 
lokalnih samouprav (izkazujejo nekakšen "promet" v primerjavi s stroški 
skladnosti obdavčevanja poslovnih enot), bi tudi te podatke lahko 
uporabili za ugotavljanje zveze med njimi. 
Zveza med upravnimi stroški taks za uporabnike nepremičnin kot 
odstotkom prejetih prihodkov in velikostjo lokalne samouprave (merjena 
kot ti prejeti prihodki) temelji na predpostavki, da se ob povečanju 
velikosti (prihodka) zmanjša odstotek upravnih stroškov iz naslova teh 
prihodkov. Vpliv obsega prihodka na navedeni odstotek je prikazan z 
dvojnim logaritemskim modelom degresije Y = α * X b. Ta model 
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neposredno določa elastičnost odvisne spremenljivke (upravni stroški kot 
odstotek prihodkov) glede na neodvisno spremenljivko (prihodki od taks 
za uporabnike). 
Številka je pridobljena s pomočjo logaritemskih vrednosti podatkov iz 
raziskave. Očitno je, da bo s povečanjem prihodkov odstotek stroškov 
močno upadel (R = 0,9213; R2 = 0,8488; p < 0,01). Celo 84,88 % 
razliko v velikosti stroškov bi lahko pojasnili z obsegom prihodkov. 
To kaže na degresivno naravo teh stroškov glede na velikost 
(podobno kot pri stroških skladnosti za obdavčevanje). To je posledica 
fiksnega elementa teh stroškov ne glede na njihovo velikost, kar kaže na 
konkurenčno slabši položaj manjših samouprav, ki je zlasti izrazit na 
začetku, kot je razvidno iz naklona krivulje (zveza med spremenljivkami je 
eksponentna). 
Rezultati kažejo tudi, da je brez pomena računati "povprečno 
učinkovitost" (odstotek stroškov v prihodkih), saj je razpon podatkov zelo 
širok in zajema vrednosti od 5 % do 50 %. 
Rezultati izkazujejo degresivni učinek upravnih stroškov taks za 
uporabnike nepremičnin. Stroški so nedvomno degresivni, pri čemer so 
majhne enote lokalne samouprave bistveno bolj obremenjene, predvsem 
najmanjše. Iz literature je namreč dobro znano, da je degresivni učinek 
stroškov skladnosti izrazit predvsem na nižjem območju velikostne lestvice 
(nekoliko milejši je na višjem območju lestvice). To dokazuje tudi naša 
raziskava. 
Čeprav se pričujoča raziskava osredotoča samo na takse za 
uporabnike v povezavi z nepremičninami (kjer njihove upravne stroške v 
celoti nosijo lokalne samouprave), je očitno, da bi lahko rezultate razširili 
na druga področja. 
Iz rezultatov raziskave izhajata dve možnosti za reformo. Prva je 
uvedba ena same takse oziroma lokalnega nepremičninskega davka, ki bi 
nadomestila vse omenjene takse, kar bi predvidoma zmanjšalo upravne 
stroške lokalnih samoupravnih enot. Po drugi strani pa bi lahko 
obračunavanje na podlagi vrednosti nepremičnin povzročilo dodatne 
upravne stroške (zlasti v začetni fazi). Zato bi bila potrebna primerjalna 
analiza ustreznih prihrankov in morebitnih novonastalih stroškov. 
Druga možnost se navezuje na povezovanje majhnih lokalnih 
samouprav v splošno, ali pa vsaj tistih njihovih enot, ki obračunavajo in 
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pobirajo takse/davke, kar bi preprečilo/omililo negativni degresivni 
učinek upravnih stroškov v najmanjših enotah. Potrebnost takšnih reform 
ne izhaja samo iz omejene analize v tej raziskavi, temveč tudi iz 
degresivnega učinka drugih vrst stroškov, ki bremenijo najmanjše lokalne 
samouprave. 
 
